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CHAPTER I
 
DEFINING NATIONALISM
 
A majority of the studies concerning the European continent have 
focused only upon the well-chronicled sagas left behind by specific countries. 
Volumes have been published on the French Revolution, German Empires, 
Italian Fascism, the Hapsburg Empire, and the rises and falls of each 
individual nation. An increasingly popular euphemism is put forth in Chaos 
Theory, wherein a butterfly beating its wings in Japan will alter the weather 
in New York City. In science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events 
can have a point of crisis that can magnify small changes.! From such a 
perspective, a study focusing upon only one specific European Nation is 
confined in its focus. Each event in Europe has historically set off chain­
reactions, reverberating from nation to nation, effe~ting other courses of 
events. Perhaps at no time has this been more evident than in modern-day 
Europe, a conglomeration of different descents, languages, territories, 
customs, traditions, religions, and nationalisms. The optimal approach for 
testing hypotheses involving Europe, therefore, is a cross-sectional design in 
which these norms vary just as they do on the continent itself.2 
In a multi-national study such as that being undertaken in this paper, 
a "common denominator" must be used to assure accurate and equal 
assessment of each subject -- a precisely-stated tool proves better than a dull 
Ijames Gleick, Chaos:Making A New Life Science (New York: Penguin. 1988) 23. 
2 Raymond M. Ouch and James L. Gibson, "'Putting Up with' Fascists in Western 
Europe: A Comparitive, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance," The 
Western Political Quarterly 55, March 1992: 238. 
2 
analogy.3 The nationalisms currently presenting themselves in the European 
nations differ in numerous degrees which can only be measured with a high 
precision tool of inquiry. The tool of inquiry which will be applied 
throughout the mechanism of this paper will be a constant definition of 
nationalism. 
A clear, widely accepted definition of nationalism has traditionally 
proven elusive. Nationalism has undergone changes just as nations or, 
more specifically, each of its components has adopted a different appearance. 
This does not,' however, mean that no scholar has succeeded in accurately 
defining nationalism, but it is indicative of nationalism itself. Nationalism 
is contingent upon the climate during a particular period, during which 
several often unmeasurable factors contribute to the formation of a collective 
mentality. The predominant nationalism of a time and place is thus 
answerable to the factors which are given emphasis. at that particular time. It 
is this relativism inherent in nationalism which helps it to elude man's 
attempts at defining it ; when nationalism is traced from its birth, it becomes 
apparent that its form is dependent upon many elements composing that 
specific period. 
Nationalism itself is relatively young when compared to man's co­
habitation on this planet. The French Revolution marks the first great 
presence of nationalism as a dynamic force. Before the period of the late 
eighteenth century, a maturation process was taking place, nurturing 
conditions which would make the emergence of nationalism possible. These 
conditions were political, economic, and intellectual and continue even 
3 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
1971) 18. 
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today to fuel versions of nationalism.4. These conditions have historically 
proven to be closely interconnected, reacting in both positive and negative 
ways with one another while effecting peoples in equally diverse ways. With 
the advent of nationalism, the masses were no longer in the nation-state, 
but of the nation-state.5 
The birth of nationalism in the late eighteenth century cultivated 
within the masses a desire for a nation-state. The nation-state owes its 
existence to the birth of nationalism in the late eighteenth century and the 
growth of the two concepts -- nationalism and the integration of the masses 
into a common political form -- thus ran parallel to each other. Nationalism 
became a driving force in man's aspir-ations for a nation-state.6 The form of 
nationalism bred by the French Revolution soon spread to all parts of the 
globe, becoming one of the main currents of the nineteenth century and, in 
the twentieth century became even a stronger force than religion as the main 
contributor to the fall of the Hapsburg empire.7 Two World Wars, including 
the dramatic growth of fascism in Europe at that time, were fueled by 
nationalism and the subsequent Cold War likewise was born and died in part 
because of nationalism and insistence upon the. sanctity of the nation-state 
and the ideologies staunchly supported by these nation-states. It cannot be 
denied that nationalism and the concept of the nation-state are forces which 
have been "more important in shaping the history of Europe and the world 
4 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism(New York: MacMillan. 1960) 3.
 
5 lllliL., 20.
 
6 l.1lli1.., 4.
 
7 Joseph Roth, Romane "Der Radetzky Marsch" (Kaln : Verlag Kiepenhauer and
 
Witsch. 1984) 499.
 
"Die Zeit will uns nicht mehr! Diese Zeit will sich erst selbstiindige 
Nationalstaaten schaffen! Man glaubt nie mehr an Gott. Die neue 
Religion ist der Nationalisinus." 
•
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in the last two centuries than the ideas of freedom and parliamentary 
democracy or of com~unism."8 
Each version of nationalism in the last two centuries has possessed 
different combinations of driving forces behind it. Historical climates and 
events leave their signatures on each nation-state and varying nationalisms. 
Lack of common specific elements, therefore, point to the possibility that 
nationalism does not exist as a clearly defined entity. Instead, as it plays the 
role of slave to history, reacting in no set way at each checkpoint, a 
multitude of manifestations of nationalism exist. As Peter Alter states, "it is 
. 
more appropriate to speak of nationalisms in the plural than of nationalism 
in the singular." 9 DifficultY in submitting an accurate definition of 
nationalism, therefore rests on the fact that it is relevant to many factors 
which vary from nation-state to nation-state. One must avoid ambiguity 
while still incorporating elements which apply to each instance of 
nationalism. Our definition of nationalism begins with the nation-state, for 
it is a natural tendency of man to love his birthplace and all which it 
embraces -- childhood, shared language, land, climate, history, and all else 
that is familiar and comfortable. Historian and sociologist Eugen Lemberg 
describes these elements as the nuclei around which a group's awareness of 
its own location can crystallize, elements which "integrate the group and 
demarcate its environment."lO 
The actual, physical nation-state gives concreteness to man's 
attachment to the native soil, the Heimat, and to man's kin and kind.ll It is 
8 Peter Alter, Nationalismus (Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkampf Verlag. 1985) 4.
 
9 lllliL.. 5.
 
10 Eugen Lemberg, Nationalismus (Hamburg: Reinbek. 1964) 42.
 
11 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 18. 
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therefore fully understandable that this natural tendency of man is a 
prerequisite for nationalism as man will take pride in his land and be easily 
swayed to believe in its superiority.l2 The nation-state becomes a vehicle for 
man to translate his consciousness into deeds or organized action. According 
to Hans Kohn, "nationalism demands the nation-state; the creation of the 
nation-state strengthens nationalism. Here, as elsewhere in history, we find 
a continuous interdependence and interaction."13 A core thus is formed for a 
definition of nationalism -- the love which man has for his birthplace and the 
nation-state as it is an active corporate will of the body which he loves. 
It is no doubt easiest to gauge nationalism by how man expresses 
nationalist feelings through the body 'and mechanisms of the nation-state. 
Although manifestations of nationalisms are most easily observed at the 
nation-state level, nationalism may be found at the level of the individual. 
Also, nationalism need not always be dynamic as it can lie dormant as a state 
of mind so long as it gives 'national' messages preferred status in social 
communication and a greater weight in making decisions. In the opinion of 
Karl Deutsch, a nationalist devotes greater attention to those concepts which 
"carry specific symbols of nationality, or which originate from a specific 
national source."14 Peter Alter also supports this view of nationalism as a 
system of prioritization in which the nation-state receives indiscriminate 
preference over all else. Alter, however, takes on perhaps a more extreme 
stance in believing nationalism motivates peoples to totally disregard other 
nations for the sacrosanct honor of their own nation. From this perspective, 
nationalism glows in a negative light, suggesting an extreme ideology 
12 lh.i.d.... 4.
 
13 lJllil... 19.
 
14 Alter. NationalisIDus. 23.
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promoting xenophobia and racism. IS Thus, it becomes readily apparent that 
nationalism as a mass movement with xenophobic tendencies can prove 
harmful to the prospects of a harmonious union of states as such a definition 
excludes from its purview all who do not belong to its own nation-state -- i.e. 
the vast majority of the human race.l 6 Here it is important to note that the 
character of nationalism does not always adopt a dark cloak of xenophobia, 
but can be found as a state of mind receiving nourishment from hopes and 
desires to seek the common good for the Heima t. 
Theodor Schieder supports the view that nationalism need not be only 
. 
a mass movement but also a state of mind or ideology. In his definition, 
nationalism is viewed as both a political movement and an ideology which 
places the nations and the sovereign nation-state upon the highest pedestal as 
crucial indwelling values. The reaction between ideology and political 
movement is cafalyzed by nationalism. Schieder in this way considers 
nationalism to be primarily a dynamic principle capable of "engendering 
hopes, emotions, and action while contributing to a solidarity among 
peoples for the purpose of achieving a common goal" for the nation-state.l 7 
After important distinctions are drawn between nationalism as a 
movement of the masses and nationalism as an ideology of the individual, a 
skeleton of a definition of nationalism emerges. Nationalism results from 
joining a human tendency to love the Heimat with an actual physical or, as 
Benedict Anderson submits, "imagined", nation-state. This relationship of a 
matrimonial nature provides the seed for nationalism -- a state of mind 
which gives the utmost priority to matters and issues of the state. This 
15 Ullil.., 24. 
16 EJ. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge.
 
1990) 168.
 
17 Alter, Nationalismus, 8.
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relationship can adopt numerous outward appearances or it may lie dormant 
within the individual as a content love of the homeland. Outward 
manifestations can be noted in numerous ways, among them observations of 
political and cultural activity. Manifestations of nationalism, then, give us 
the most accurate measurements of nationalisms and it is from this 
springboard that we will be catapulted into a comparison study of two present 
versions of nationalisms -- that of a reunified Germany and that of Austria. 
Such a comparison will furnish our thus far skeletal definition of 
nationalism with muscle and tissue so that, at the conclusion of the study, a 
clearly defined body shall emerge -- a body which will dictate the course of 
events in Central Europe and carry the continent into the 21st century. 
•
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CHAPTER II 
POST-REUNIFICATION GERMAN NATIONALISM 
"The heavy doors click open and I look cautiously down the aisle of the 
courtroom. A slim man dressed in black, the defendant, is in mid-sentence: '. 
. . I am indeed a National Socialist, and I publicly acknowledge it. .. '" 
Michael Schmidt, author of The New Reich, made the above 
observation not in Munich circa 1924, nor at the Nuremburg Trials following 
World War II, • but in Frankfurt am Main in 1989.1 Since that time, Germany 
has seen a revival of its past which she has so hard tried to bury. Following 
the Wiedervereinigung of 1989, a unified Germany has at times appeared to 
be merely resuming its habits which were abruptly halted at the end of the 
World War II by the splitting of Germany into two parts. Nazism, or neo­
Nazism as the practice of xenophobic nationalism iscalled today, has 
reappeared, giving rise to concerns in Germany, Europe, and the 
international community. Neo-Nazism stands as a threat to any other form' 
of German nationalism and thus deserves careful analysis if Germany is to 
truly escape the vice grips of her past. 
Public discussion of neo-Nazism in united Germany is marked by fear 
of a growing, aggressive xenophobia, acceptance of violence against 
foreigners, and, correspondingly, a growing number of perpetrators and 
victims.2 Further public discussion arises over possible contributors to these 
issues. Unemployment and unprecedented inflation, for example, have 
1 Michael Schmidt, The New Reich (New York: Pantheon Books. 1993) 3.
 
2 Klaus J. Bade, "Immigration and Social Peace in United Germany," Daedelus: TournaI of the
 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences Winter 1994: 85.
 
-9 
contributed to dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the united German 
Valko People are not preoccupied with the issues of culture over more 
traditional questions relating to economic growth because these issues are 
seen to be related, creating political tensions of a kind not previously 
addressed.3 As a timeline of neo-Nazism since the end of the cold war escorts 
us through anti-foreigner violence in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, MolIn, 
Solingen, and other German cities recently scarred by hate, it becomes 
apparent that the causes of such violence must be sought and analyzed if an 
assessment of the strength of right-wing nationalism in Germany is to be 
found. Such an assessment will grant valuable insight into the direction 
Germany will be taking on a nationalism spectrum with xenophobia on the 
right and a more tolerant multi-nationalist spirit on the left. 
Any society will resent an influx of strangers for which it is not 
prepared.4 As the cold war ended and waves of foreigners sought more 
prosperous lives through Germany's liberal asylum laws, the two newly 
joined lands of Germany began to experience economic hardships. The 
Wirtschaftswunder guaranteed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl's soon yielded to 
the cold reality of ballooning inflation and rising unemployment.(See Figure 
1) With economic problems demanding increased attention, the new 
Germany was not prepared for the number of asylum-seekers streaming 
across her borders. 
3 Daedelus Winter 1994: Preface.
 
4 Chaim Bermant, ''Pride and Prejudice in Germany," Chica&o Tribune 5 Sept. 1992, natL ed.,
 
sec. 1: 19.
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Euphoria over the economy emanated from Chancellor Kohl, who 
forecasted aWirtschaftswunder in which economic integration of East and 
West Germany would flow smoothly. Increases in taxation were ruled out by 
Kohl as early as April 1990 as he pointed to the East German propensity to 
consume and the universal German characteristic to work.s Within months, 
however, Kohl's comments lost credibility when the President of the 
Bundesbank, Karl Otto Pohl, resigned over vehement disagreement with the 
economic policies towards reunification.6 
. 
Unemployment in East and West Germany began to rise. Eastern 
German firms became casualties of the transformation into a capitalist and 
entrepreneurial economy while being surrounded by the chaos and 
disintegration of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nowhere was 
this difficulty better exemplified than in Rostock, a Plain port of shipping 
traffic through the Baltic. Along with the ruin of the Soviet Empire came a 
fall in demand for Rostock's ships. At realistic pricing levels, Rostock's 
quality products were uncompetitive in the West and the old market for the 
ships, the Soviet Union, could no longer afford the prices. Businesses folded 
and people lost jobs. No other work was available in Rostock and 
unemployment rose by leaps and bounds, extending to well over 60%.7 Such 
a situation echoed throughout eastern Germany as decrease in demand and 
rising prices translated to high unemployment rates. West Germany even 
began to see a rise in unemployment beginning in 1991. It soon became 
apparent that Kohl's Wirtschaftswunder was only a mirage. 
5 Ibid..6.
 
6 ''Pohl Grund fiir D-Mark," Siiddeutsche Zeitung 10 Dec. 1993. (Obtained through
 
LEXUS/NEXUS)
 
7 Bennant, "Pride and Prejudice in Germany".
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The unprecedented rises in unemployment contributed to increased 
appeal of the neo-Nazis. With jobless totals of 2.26 million in West Germany 
and 1.2 in East Germany, with 400,000 people on part-time employment 
creation programs in the West and 1.7 million in the East, the Right found 
itself in a promising environment. "Thus, in the first year of reunification 
the seed was sown and xenophobia stood poised to reap the harvest. ttB 
In Why Men Rebel by Ted Robert Gurr, an abstract model for perceived 
justification for violence is submitted. Though it was proposed in 1960, the 
model still holds true today. Gurr cites justifications for violence as being 
effective "to the extent that"they make sense to disoriented people in terms of 
their specific deprivations and their past experiences." In order to appeal to 
groups who experience deprivation, specific ideas are required in identifying 
the sources of deprivation and prescribing remedial action.9 Such social 
movements succeed in uniting members to the extent that the movements' ' 
appeals suggest solutions which are appropriate to the particular situations of 
their audience.l0 In Germany, the groups experiencing deprivation grew in 
number as the unemployment rate climbed. A frustrated and discontented 
public, according to Gurr's theory, would seek specific ideas in identifying 
the sources of deprivation and prescribing remedial action. If such a specific 
idea surfaced, and was perceived as plausible, the German peoples deprived of 
jobs and subsequent livelihood would be moved to unite. 
8 Ibid. ,8.
 
9 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1970) 202.
 
10 Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1965)
 
13-19.
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An idea. specifying the sources of deprivation among unemployed and 
dicontented people surfaced. The idea which made the greatest sense to the 
discontented people in Germany was that the massive influx of foreigners 
was the direct cause for the failure of the Wirtschaftswunder. With the 
economy in trouble and no clear end in sight, widespread disenchantment 
with politics found one of its major outlets in populist and extremist reaction 
against uncontrolled immigration.ll Prior to the close of 1992, when the 
coalition parties of the Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union, 
and Free Democratic Party, as well as the major opposition party, the Social 
Democrat Party, reached an agreement on legislation regulating political 
asylum, emigration, and naturalization of foreigners in Germany, the 
refugee law in Germany was perhaps the most liberal in the world.l2 In 
Figure 3, the massive increase in number of asylum seekers, or 
Asylbewerber, iri Germany between 1987 and 1992 is shown. Under Article 16 
of the German Federal Constitution, called Basic Law or Grundgesetz, all 
persons who claimed to be politically persecuted were entitled to seek asylum 
in Germany and remain until the case was settled -- a period generally lasting 
two to three years. This Grundgesetz represented part of Germany's 
atonement for racial persecution in the Third Reich. During this period, the 
Asylbewerber were granted housing, food, schooling, medical care, and a 
monthly check. Such policy bred resentment among taxpaying Germans and 
even more so among the growing number of unemployed.l3 
11 "Germany:The Pressured Power," Forei&n PoliO' Summer 1993: 44.
 
12 Stephen Chapman, "A normal nation dogged by an abnormal history, " Chica&o Tribune 4
 
Oct. 1992, natl. ed., sec 1: 3.
 
13 .ILlli!... 3.
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During the 1980s the number of Asylbewerber in Germany fueled the 
appeal of the extremist Right as such right-wing political parties as the 
Nationale Partei Deutschlands increased in popularity. However, the 
economy at that time was stable enough to the point where the Asylbewerber 
were tolerated and the number of discontented Germans was relatively low.l4 
It was not until the reunification of Germany and the subsequent rise in 
unemployment and inflation that the number of discontented voices became 
significant enough to be heard. Enter the neo-Nazis and the xenophobic 
Right, dark shadows of Germany's past. 
"What do they want here? You know how they are. We should stuff 
them in a package and send them back. They live better than us. We 
pay for them and then they take our jobs away."lS 
The quote comes from a neo-Nazi and reflects the perceived link 
between the number of Asylbewerber in Germany and the frustration over 
rising unemployment. In comparing Figures 1,2, and 3, a correlation 
seemingly appears between the rise in the number of violent criminal acts 
committed by right-wing extremists and the number of Asylbewerber . 
Unemployment simultaneously displayed an upward trend, although it lags 
a full year behind the clear rises in right-wing violence and Asylbewerber. It 
therefore appears that, as public discontent grew, so too did the intensity of 
xenophobic activity. If dissidents -- in this case, the unsatisfied Germans or 
right-wing extremists -- don't feel their voices are being heard, they are likely 
to use terrorist tactics to publicize their existence and objectives, widen 
14 Dangers from the Right ?, 9. .
 
15 "Lieber sterben als nach Sachsen," Der Spiegel 30 Sept. 1991: 31.
 
'Wat wollen die hier? Die kannste so, wie sie sind, in ein Paket schniiren und 
wieder wegschicken. Die wohnen besser als wir. Wir bezahlen flir die, und dann 
schnappen sie uns Deutschen noch die Jobs weg," 
•
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popular support by providing symbolic models for aggression, and by 
demonstrating the regime's incapacity to provide protection, hoping 
ultimately to overthrow it. l6 Such has been the case with the right-wing in 
Germany. As the government displayed little commitment to addressing the 
asylum problems, the right-wing provided symbolic models for aggression 
through increased violence by neo-Nazis and skinheads and right-wing 
political parties sought mor~ support for reforming the government. 
It was in'Hoyerswerda, a German town less than 50 miles from the 
Polish border, in the autumn of 1991 that German xenophobia first burst in 
the consciousness of a wider Federal Republic)7 Prior to that date, there was 
little mention of xenophobia in German newspapers discussing the major 
problems facing a unified Germany. 230 Asylbewerber were housed in 
Hoyerswerda when neo-Nazi groups appeared: 
"... shouting their hatred and their demand that Germany be made 
"alien free," they attacked the hostel in which the foreigners were 
housed. Their violence was premeditated, thorough, and sustained."l8 
Rocks and Molotov cocktails were hurled through the windows as hundreds 
of citizens stood idle in the streets without protesting. On-lookers even 
cheered as the police appeared not to stop the violent neo-Nazis, but to ferry 
away the asylum seekers. A shocked Germany asked herself why nothing was 
done to directly confront the xenophobic neo-Nazis. The neo-Nazis appeared 
to display more political self-confidence than ever before.l 9 
16 Gurr, Why Men Rebel. 212. 
17 Dan~rs from the Right? 12. 
18~12. 
19 Ibid..12. 
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The events in Hoyerswerda were not isolated. Neo-Nazi attacks on 
foreigners reappeared in Rostock throughout 1991 before peaking in August 
of 1992 when several hundred neo-Nazis mounted a week-long campaign 
against foreigners designed to instill fear and drive them out. A total of 
nearly two thousand bystanders stood by and applauded. Xenophobic 
violence had reached a level of fervor not seen in Germany since the days of 
the Third Reich. The government, meanwhile, failed to display any resolve 
on the matter outside of anti-racist lipservice. Helmut Kohl, on 27 August, 
stated: 
"those who threaten the lives and physical integrity of people, set 
houses on fire and stir up hatrep. of foreigners must be punished with 
the full severity permitted under our system of criminallaw."20 
Following these comments, it was a full four months before any formal 
action against the right-wing was taken by the coalition government. The 
police continued to appear at riots, making token arrests while others 
cheered. The criticisms of the lack of governmental action against the right­
wing and the asylum issue mounted. 
Democratic instability results in radical voting -- support for either the 
radical right or left,21 While right-wing nationalist violence gained 
momentum, so too did the right-wing political parties in Germany. It is 
important to note, however, that the Verfassungsschutz, the major 
government agency currently countering xenophobic activity in Germany, 
has failed to produce evidence of overt collusion between the extremist 
parliamentary parties and the neo-Nazi street groups.22 Under German law a 
20 Hostility towards forei~1ers in Germany: Facts, analyses, arguments, 72. (A booklet 
distributed by the Verfassungsschutz and obtainable through Goethe Institut, Chicago, IL) . 
16 
party can only be banned if its leaders openly advocate violence; it is not 
adequate grounds for banishment if they practice violence individually. Also, 
the traditional symbols of Nazism such as the Hitler salute or the swastika are 
strictly forbidden. As the right-wing political parties have thus far failed to 
reveal a link to neo-Nazi violence, they have earned the nickname "the 
respectable Right. "22 
The two main right-wing parties in Germany are the Republikaner 
and the Deutsche Volkunion (DVu). Both parties have granted immigration 
the spotlight on their platforms, hoping to extend debate on the 
Asylbewerber issue to a more profound and volkisch topic -- German 
nationalism and identity. Both parties are publicly anti-foreigner, 
campaigning under the warcry: "Germany for the Germans." At a time when 
a reunified Germany struggles for resolutions conc~rning the foreigner issue, 
the core issue of the right-wing has gone from peripheral to pivota1.23 
The Republikaner Party has thus far proven to be the more popular of 
the two right-wing political parties in Germany. Led by former SS officer 
Franz Schonhuber, the Republicans have repeatedly cited a "criminalization 
of German history" -- the feeling that Germany should no longer be held 
hostage by the guilt of her misdeeds during the Third Reich. As long as she is 
made to feel guilty for the crimes of Adolf Hitler, they argue, she will never 
take proper pride in her identity.24 It was this guilt, the Republikaner 
21 Raymond M. Duch and James L. Gibson, "'Putting up with; Fascists in Western Europe: A
 
Comparitive, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance," The Western Political TournaI Fall
 
1993: 237.
 
22 Dan&ers from the Ri~ht? 21.
 
23.l1lliL 32.
 
24.l1lliL 28.
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maintained, which prevented Germany from administering proper attention 
to the interests of Germans themselves and the seriousness of the foreigners 
abusing Germany's liberal asylum laws. 
In 1989, the Republikaners , though a member of the "respectable 
right", a party with an anti-foreigner platform nonetheless, shocked Germany 
by winning seats in the Berlin City Senate, obtaining 7.5% of the vote. Later 
that year, Schonhuber's party gained 7.1 % and 6 seats in the European 
Parliamentary elections -- a higher total than the stalwart parties of German 
politics. In Bavaria, a traditional stronghold of National Socialists during the 
Third Reich, the Republikaners garnered over 14% of the vote. The 
reunification of 1989, however, initially translated to a set-back for the right­
wing. However, they capitalized on the ever-increasing immigrant issue and 
growing reluctahce toward the economy to make great gains again in 1992.25 
In 1992, both right-wing parties experienced increased popularity while 
confronting the central issues of a more powerful unified Germany -- a 
Germany which in their opinion could be proud of her national identity. As 
further discussion of the immigration issue spread closer to the dry 
underbrush of neo-Nazism, the main ruling parties saw the need to take 
action. Xenophobic fire threatened to spread unless the big parties could 
persuade its sufferers that 1) Germany's borders were not an un-policed free­
for-all, and 2) that keeping out all foreigners, even if at all possible, would 
be wrong.26 
25 "Survey on Gennany," The Economist. 23 May 1992: 14. 
26 Ibid.. 18. 
•
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Government efforts to quash the rise of the radical Right adopted a 
two-pronged attack. Chancellor Kohl brought the government's efforts to the 
public's attention at a ,cabinet meeting on 2 December, 1992: 
"In the past few days it (our constitutional democracy) has proved once 
more that it is willing to use all the means at its disposal in combatting .. 
extremist violence and terror."27 
The offensive against xenophobia enlisted four working groups to compose a 
mass effort by the Verfassungsschutz to coordinate all government action to 
. 
counter extremist violence and terror with the aid of departmental 
secretaries. The Verfassungsschutz Advisory Groups covered problems 
ranging from violence among young people to protective measures by police 
and intelligence authorities.28 
The other prong of the government's attack on xenophobia attempted 
to isolate the apparent core of the problem -- the issue of asylum. Germany's 
liberal asylum laws were examined as right-wing, anti-foreigner violence 
increased. This reconsideration of Article 16, Section 2 of the Basic Law was 
initially seen as pandering to the right-wing groups, adding legitimacy to 
their platforms. However, others argued that curbing the flow of 
Asylbewerber would serve the obviously desirable purpose of defusing social 
tensions.29 
The governing coalition and the Social Democrats reached a 
compromise agreement in December of 1992 on new regulations on asylum. 
27 Hostility towards foreilmers in Germany: Facts analyses, arguments. 21.
 
28 Ibid .. 22.
 
29 "Survey on Germany," The Economist: 9.
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The new regulations still begin with the statement, "Politische Verfolgte 
genieflen Asylrecht" ("persons prosecuted on political grounds shall enjoy 
the right to asylum" ) and continue to add that persons from a member state 
of the European Community, or from another "third state" which adheres to 
the Geneva Convention or to the European Human Rights Convention, will 
not have the right to asylum. In such cases where it is agreed one has no 
right to apply for asylum based on the fact that the state is considered 
"secure", officials have recourse to deportation, or aufenthaItsbeendede 
Maflnahmen. 
Since the government's main parties have cracked down on rightist 
organizations and addressed the asylum issue, right wing violence has seen a 
dramatic decrease. (See Figure 2) In January of 1994, the amount of right­
wing violence <;:ontinued the downward trend, falling from 36,279 in January 
of 1993 to only 13,154,30 At the same time, popularity of right-wing political 
parties has at least for the meantime subsided, a fact which has relieved fears 
among German politicians, considering 1994 is an election year. With the 
"respectable Right" neutralized, it would seem some sort of correlation exists 
between the fall of xenophobic violence and the measures taken by the 
government. Such a correlation, when broadened, poses a more profound 
question: Does right-wing nationalism in Germany rely upon foreigners as a 
spark? If so, does the current trend mean that Germans, Europeans, and 
other members of the international community can breathe a collective sigh 
of relief? 
These data do in fact seem to point to a direct connection between 
right-wing nationalism in Germany and the influx of foreigners. However, 
-20 
caution must be practiced when attempting to draw such a conclusion. As 
discussed in Chapter I, the concept of nationalism encompasses all which is 
embraced in the Heimat -- childhood, shared language, land, climate, 
history, culture, and all else that is familiar and comfortable to the native.30 
In gauging the effect of foreigners treading on the soil of the Heimat, one 
must also consider the number and character of the the strangers, their 
degree of strangeness, their concentration in anyone area, the rate of influx, 
and above all the prevailing economic climate.31 As the present economic 
climate shows little sign of improving, this factor would not seem to playas 
great a role as the former. Still, however, the fact that unemployment 
continues to grow is reason for concetn when the factors which seemed to 
lead to neo-Nazi violence in Rostock are considered. 
The apparent correlation shown by the data is.in no way definite, as 
numerous factors must be considered when debating the "German Question." 
For example, does German reunification represent an attempted fusion of 
two distinctly different identities -- that of the communist East and the 
capitalist West -- or is it a rejoining of the Volk, or one distinct national 
identity which merely took a 45 year hiatus? Germans of 1990 tended to view 
reunification in the latter perspective, 73% ofEast Germans subscribing to the 
idea of there being a single German identity. In 1993, following increased 
discontent and instability, only 22% of West Germans and 11 % of East 
Germans said they shared a common identity.32 Such statistics point at a 
30 Eugen Lemberg, Nationalismus (Hamburg: Reinbek 1990).
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present perception of the Wiedervereinigung as being little more than a legal 
binding of two different peoples. 
Germany has historically been situated at a crossroads between East and 
West. In the twentieth century this geopolitical position translated to a 
flashpoint between materialism, capitalism, and democracy of the West and 
communism of the East. Right-wing nationalism seems to be more of a 
natural defensive reaction to the end of the cold war than a renewal of the 
Third Reich. Both real and imaginary threats fuel defensive reactions -- "and 
a combination of international population movements with the ultra-rapid, 
fundamental, and unprecedented socio-economic transformations so 
characteristic of the third quarter of our century. "33 Nazism provides a 
convenient means for right-wing groups to deal with discontent, as it 
represents a unfted Germany's last great attempt to address these problems. 
In analyzing German history and her various nationalisms, we 
confront a profound discontinuity and its consequences. There has been a 
crucial discontinuity of both state and nation in the German historical 
experience and "this lack of unity ... is in fact the central problem of German 
history"34 Discontinuity has again greatly affected Germany in the wake of the 
cold war as ideological and human barriers dispelled euphoria. It is difficult 
in Germany for people to give the utmost priority to a Heimat when two 
Heimats exist, exacerbating the differences in ideology, history, and culture 
33 E.]. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press
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of the last 45 years. This development, which has traversed a broad range of 
opinion and objection, has resulted in intolerance and bigotry.35 
When one reflects upon the concept of a unified German identity, the 
mind immediately shifts to images of Adolf Hitler addressing throngs of 
nationalistic Germans, or the extermination of millions of Jews at the hands .. 
of a culture in which nationalism had reached a point of fanatical racism. 
Consequently, many "character analyses of Germany have focused on 
Nazism and World War II and the pressures and emotions of war have often 
had a clearly negative impact on their quality."36 A unified Germany 
searching for a common identity thus bears a huge weight on her shoulders. 
Other nations can behave selfishly or even stupidly without being suspected 
of monstrous intentions, but Germany's history dooms it to relentless 
scrutiny. "Tholigh there may be more neo-Nazis in Boise than Dresden, two 
brownshirts in Germany will always inspire more alarm than 20 anywhere 
else."37 This fear is justified when the shadow of Adolf Hitler leads neo-Nazis 
to raids on asylum-seekers, but seems exaggerated in light of other 
predominant nationalisms of today, the discontinuity of Germany's past, and 
the walls which still divide Germany. 
In 1960, Hans Kohn wrote: 
"political nationalism under present conditions conflicts with the 
main trends of human affairs, which is away from isolationism and 
towards interdependence. The aim of right-wing nationalism is not 
service and cooperation but exclusiveness and monopoly."38 
35 David T. Zoud and Frank Zitka, "The walls that still divide Germany," The Chicago
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Today, a great stress is placed upon multi-lateral agreements and missions. 
The UN adopts a greater global role than ever before and other agreements 
such as GATT or Maastricht boldly state that no country can benefit from 
isolationist polities. At the same time, there is constant evidence of the 
possibly divisive nature of nationalism in such cases as secessionist 
movements in the old nation-states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. There 
seem to be two contradictory trends in nationalism presently at work: one 
encouraging integration and the other yearning for fragmentation of states. 
These two forces are unfolding concurrently in Germany.39 
Discontinuity has thus far discouraged Germans from embracing the 
right-wing policies of her past. So long as different pasts, real or imagined, 
linger in the German psyche, no single national identity will emerge. The 
different pasts occupy center stage in the issue of why East and West are 
distinctly different.4o It is almost no matter that the political West German 
identity, actually possessing political structure, is a stable one compared to 
the the East German.41 If it is left to East Germans to integrate into the West, 
the Ossis will continue to feel alienated, being only observers in their 
current social and cultural metamorphosis.42 Alienation only breeds 
resentment, bigotry, egoism, and ignorance -- all of which threaten the 
successes reached through the reunification of Germany. 
38 Hans Kohn,The Idea of Nationalism (Toronto: Collier Books 1960): 23.
 
39 Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations without States," Foreilm Affairs May/June 1994 vo1.73: 112.
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For an identity to emerge in a united Germany, all Germans will need 
to share common pasts and a common goal. The lack of continuity in a 
German state has created two distinct pasts which a unified Germany will 
need to negotiate. On one hand, a unified Germany will need to share rather 
than shun memories of the last unified German state. Secondly, a new , post­
cold war past in which references to cold war Germany are not made will 
need to be developed, for it was during the cold war when the two Germanys 
grew apart and it will be in memories of the cold war that differences between 
the two Germanys will be most apparent. Time will be a major requirement. 
These pasts of both Germanys will need to be analyzed and reoriented toward 
a democratic future.43 Such a process' is already taking place; the German 
government displayed resolve to this process of integration in its action 
against a resurgence of Germany's neo-Nazi tendencies. Today, as right-wing 
activities appear to be subsiding, the two Germanys may be overcoming the 
first major test of the new Germany, preparing to focus her sights on one 
German Identittit which is proving capable of dealing with resurgences of her 
dark past. In Germany, such issues merit attention, for 'those who do not face 
their past are bound to relive it.'44 Democracy and integration have been and 
must continue to be the driving forces of Germany, forbidding a xenophobic 
nationalism from taking root. 
43 Le Gloannec, "On German Identity," Daedelus: 145.
 
44 Paraphrased from booklet distributed at Auschwitz Concentration Camp Memorial,
 
Oswiecem, Poland.
 
•
 
25 
CHAPTER III 
A NEW AUSTRIAN IDENTITY? 
Behind the State Opera House in Vienna and adjacent to the Hofburg 
is the Albertinaplatz which exemplifies the Austrian question of nationalism. 
The Hofburg is an icon of the glory days of Imperial Austria and the 
Hapsburg Empire. On the Platz stands an upright slab of concrete upon 
which names are engraved. The slab commemorates victims of racism and 
anti-semitism -- dark shadows of Austria's past which includes the reduction 
of the Jewish· population from 200,000 before World War II to mere hundreds 
afterward: Only a few blocks Hom the monument, along the Kiirntnerstrafle , 
one can find the headquarters for the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (The 
Freedom Party of Austria"), Austria's growing right-wing party. The setting 
presents an appropriate contrast for a study of the "Austrian Question" of 
nationalism. ; 
Occupying a landmass slightly larger than the state of Massachusetts; 
Austria is today a country lost among the massive change taking place around 
her. The Soviet Union has crumbled, surrendering republics now struggling 
to establish free-market economies while searching for national identities lost 
during the regime. The road to West European Unity has unleashed potholes 
and pratfalls as various nations struggle with domestic issues. Along the 
southern fringe of Central Europe, a war rages on. Despite her small size and 
neutral status, Austria's role should not be underestimated. Austria is in fact 
an integral part of Western Europe, sharing its common political, economic, 
and cultural principles. Furthermore, this small country will act as an 
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outpost between Eastern and Western Europe in years to come, heavily 
influencing the nature of the continent.1 
A man stands at the Albertinaplatz distributing leaflets. The leaflet 
does not demand a high level of intellect to understand. It pits two pictures 
side by side with the apparent intention of drawing a parallel. The picture on 
the left side is of a vandalized Jewish gravemarker during World War II. 
Two letters, "55", and a swastika leave no doubt of the identity of the 
perpetrators.of the crime. The picture on the right is also of a desecrated 
Jewish Gtabstein, only the defacing spells out "Sieg Haider" ("Victory 
Haider"). Framing the two pictures is the question, "1st das 1hr Ziel, Herr 
Haider?" ("Is this your goal, Mr. Haider?") 
"Austria," as the Freedom Party of Austria's (FPO's) National 
Chairman, Jorg Haider, stated in his Vienna Statement oratory of 7 April, 
1992, "is at the point of changing in a lasting way." This declaration, unlike 
many of Haider's other statements, is indisputable. A main issue seems to be 
whether Austria, a land with a reputation for being "tradition-bound, inert, 
ossified, unwilling, and unable to move with the times," will be able to 
sustain such a change. 2 With the end of the Cold War and the opening of 
the borders between the financially stable West and impoverished East, 
hundreds of thousands of immigrants have streamed into the countries of 
Austria and Germany, applying for asylum. Such figures do not consider the 
thousand of illegal immigrants who cross borders under cover of night. The 
1 Barbara Jelavich, Modern Austria (New York: Cambride University Press 1987) 327. 
2 Karl R. Stadler, Austria (New York: Praeger 1971) 1. 
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immigrants, or Ausla'nder, seek a better way of life in a more prosperous and 
stable society. 3 
Residents of Austria have grown disgruntled over the decline of living 
standards. Unemployment has reached unprecedented levels. (See Figure 4) 
Jobs have become scarcer, housing problems have developed, and crime 
rates have skyrocketed. The target of these frustrations, just as in Germany, 
has become both the government and Ausla'nder, breathing life into anti­
foreigner, s~inhead, and neo-Nazi movements to push the foreigners out. 
"Ausla'ndef Raus!", a popular slogan of the Nazis during World War II, has 
found a second life. 
In Austria, the neo-Nazi movement has yet to evolve into as great a 
problem as in:Germany; She has not experienced the same massive waves of 
attacks against homes for Asylbewerber, Jewish memorials, and foreign 
residents as in Germany.4 Nevertheless, there have been isolated acts of 
racism. In the academic school year 1992-1993, the author personally 
witnessed such acts and has been informed that such activity has not 
subsided. Swastika graffiti can be found in streetcars, in the subways, and in 
numerous other public sites. Children at Gymnasiums harass immigrant 
children. Rallies against anti-foreigner violence are required to be supervised 
by police in riot gear. In Eisenstadt on 1 November, 1992, a Jewish cemetery 
was vandalized with gravemarkers being toppled and anti-foreigner messages 
being painted. It has become apparent that the foreigner problem in Austria 
stands a danger of escalating to the level of that in Germany if action is not 
3 Dr. James Wilkie, Burden Sharing (Vienna: Federal Press Service 1991) 23. (Distributed by 
the Austrian Press and Information Service, Washington, D.C.> 
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soon taken. The FPO has attempted to seize this opportunity, and today 
represents the voice of the right-wing in Austria. 
The FPO has historically been among the weakest parties in Austrian 
politics. Born from a group of almost a half-million ex-Nazis in 1949, the 
party's traditional short-coming has been a vague platform irrelevant to 
issues at hand in Austria.S From 19S6 to 1986, national election results 
indicated only a snail's pace gain in popularity of the FPO while the two main 
parties, the Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs (SPO) and the Osterreichische 
Volkspartei (OVP), continued to share an overwhelming majority·6 
During the early 1980s, while the FPO continued to flounder 
nationally, a rising leader of the FPO found a firm base of support for a future 
of the party. His name was Jorg Haider and he found popular support in 
Carinthia, a Bundesland in southern Austria which shares borders with 
Slovenia and Italy. The Carinthian power base, a Bundesland experiencirig 
significant animosity towards minority Slovenians, provided firm footing 
for a young Haider as he rose to national prominence by capturing a a large 
portion of the vote. Haider's merciless tongue-lashing of what he described 
as the "old parties", their "power monopoly", their "privilege economy", 
their policies and (mal)practices, was in full accord with the current political 
trend against the SPO? Haider garnered a majority of the popular vote in the 
1984 Carinthian election via his "volkisch" nationalism while becoming an if 
not controversial then popular figure by "exculpating ex-Nazi military figures 
on the gro~nds that they had just done their military duty."8 With a new 
policy which could potentially unite the FPO, Haider used his victory in 
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Carinthia as a springboard for his assault on the nation-wide FPO liberal 
policies. 
As Haider grew in popularity in the years following his victory in 
Carinthia, so too did the entire FPO party. In 1986, Haider rose to the 
National Chairmanship of the FPO through what has become known as the 
"Haider Putsch". The years following the Putsch continued the trend of 
increasing popularity within the FPO, as the party made giant strides in local
 
. elections. (See Figure 5) This success has ocurred at the cost of both the small
 
and grand coalitions composed of the SPO and OVP. In the national election
 
of 1991, the FPO more than doubled their previous representation at the 
national level, earning 33 seats while the grand coalition continued to slide 
toward political uncertainty.9 
Just as the issue of immigration provides the right-wing parties of 
Germany with a specific platform finally meriting national attention, the· 
FPO benefits from the advent of extreme immigration problems faced by 
Austria. Between 1981 and 1991 net foreign immigration totaled 270,000. At 
the 1991 census there was a resident foreign population of 518,000 persons 
without Austrian citizenship. This amounts to 6.6 percent of the total 
Austrian population of 7.8 million in 1991.10 Haider charges that foreigners 
are cheating natives of jobs and apartments in Austria, where the global 
economic recession has taken effect. This effect is most accurately reflected in 
the growth in Austrian unemployment since 1990. (See Figure 4) The main 
thrust of Haider's attacks on the issue of immigration took the form of the 
Ausliinder Volksbegehren and became the focus of intense public controversy 
since its conception. 
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The Volksbegehren represented an attempt, as Haider stated in his 
Viennese Statement, to: 
"... create something in the way of human right to a homeland as a 
corrective measure for the general freedom of movement, which is 
guaranteed by the colorful palate of European languages and cultures." 
The document outlined a method by which Haider felt Austria could best 
deal with the problems of mass immigration over her borders. The 
Volksbegehren aimed to address resulting problems facing Austrian society 
such as houstng shortages, decline in the quality of education, corrupt 
business practices, unemployment, and rising crime rates. Under the 
Austrian Constitution, the Volksbegehren required 100,000 signatures if it 
were to be placed on a ballot for public vote. Garnering the required amount 
of signatures would have been a victory for Haider. The require 100,000 
signatures were obtained and Austria at the close of 1992 stood poised for 
debate on an issue which would give a clear indication of the future national 
identity of Austria. 
Haider envisioned the Volksbegehren as a mechanism to "equip an 
open society with the moral strength to develop visions which will continue 
the hallmarks of future political activities."ll Opponents of the 
Volksbegehren saw it as a populist approach with an ultimate goal of fascist 
totalitarianism. A campaign began in which the grand coalition and FPC> 
argued their respective sides. 
On 24 January, 1993 a crowd estimated at 250,000 gathered before the 
Parliament building in Vienna to take part in Lichtermeer -- the "sea of 
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light". The demonstration symbolized support for immigrants and foreign 
refugees under attack from Haider's party platform and nee-Nazi violence. 
The demonstration was part of a larger counter-movement formed in 
solidarity by a group called "SOS-Mitmensch". SOS-Mitmensch received 
strong support from political parties, the Catholic Church, and Austria's 
Bundespriisident, Thomas Klestil. The movement greatly reduced support 
for Haider's proposal. The Austrian Courts, meanwhile, dissolved many 
extreme right-wing organizations and jailed a number of their leaders.12 The 
demonstration against the Volksbegehren translated to a humiliating failure 
for Haider and the FPO. 
The Volksbegehren . received only 1/2 of the 400,000 signatures 
expected by Haider. It appeared to many as if it were the beginning of the end 
for the FPO. The prospects for the party adopted a more dismal appearance in 
March 1993, when the third-ranking officer of the party, Heide Schmidt, left 
the party after publicly divulging her concern for ever-increasing rightist 
tendencies within the party. Schmidt's departure reduced the number of FPO 
seats from 33 to 28 as other dissatisfied FPOleaders followed her lead to a 
newly-formed party, the Liberale Forum.13 As a further nail into the FPO 
4 "Austrians show solidarity with Foreigners," Idaho State Tournai 24 Jan. 1993.
 
5 F. Parkinson, Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today (Detroit: Wayne
 
State University Press. 1989) 260.
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coffin, the Federation of Austrian Industry cut financing to the FPC>. The 
forecast for the FPC> suddenly became bleak, as Haider's influence on 
domestic politics was expected to diminish.l 4 
While the FPC> and J6rg Haider gained in popularity with the increase 
in foreigners, debate proceeded within the coalition government in Austria 
on how to deal with the problem. With a future wave of Ausla'nder expected 
within S years, both from the former Soviet Union and overseas developing 
countries, Austria stood little chance of controlling immigration without 
adopting reform. Reform of Austria's immigration policies has taken the 
form of a series of measures desigI1ed to keep immigration under control 
while at the same time integrating foreigners at a rate acceptable to the 
Austrian population. The first stage was the Federal Care Act of 1991, 
followed by the new Asylum Act, which went into effect 1 June 1992 and was 
a "major means of combatting abuse of the asylum procedure." Just as in 
Germany, asylum seekers in Austria are entitled to housing, food, 
schooling, and medical care until the application for asylum is processed. 
Implemented on 1 January, 1993 the Foreigners Act regulates the entry and 
residence of aliens. The fourth in the series of acts designed to better control 
the influx of immigrants while also indirectly countering the FPC> was the 
Non-Residence Act, entering into force on 1 July 1993, which "encompasses 
all those persons who intend to make Austria the center of their lives 
whether for occupational or residential reasons."lS It is worthwhile to note 
13 "Alibi Weg: Der Ansprung seiner Stell vertreterin konnte Osterreichs Populisten ]org Haider
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here that the author has recited these laws as they were communicated to 
him by the Austrian Consulate. There was no further clarification of the laws. 
As reforms of the asylum laws have been implemented, the number of 
asylum-seekers has declined. (See Figure 6) Such data would seem to 
simultaneously lead to a fall in the popularity of the FPC> as well as the core of 
their platform,' an anti-foreigner message. When the other hardships which 
beset Haider and his party are also considered, it becomes astonishing that the 
FPC> and, cGnsequently, right-wing nationalism in Austria continues to gain 
momenttim. In local elections this past March (1994), the FPC> obtained 33% 
of the vote in Carinthia, 20% in Salzburg, and 17% in Tirol. When 
compared to the last local elections in these Bundesltinder in 1989, the FPC> 
gained an average of 3%.16 Following on the heels of these victories, Haider 
is preparing himself for a successful National Election this upcoming October. 
Whether enough voters will warm to Haider's message in time for, 
October is disputable. People are still attempting to decipher the political 
messages which he delivers. Is the message of Haider a stark right-wing 
message and, if so, should the public beware, lest they are in favor of a right­
wing Austrian government? Or, is the message of Haider merely a liberal 
attempt to cope with Austria's deteriorating situation? Physically, Haider 
embodies a very appealing image to the public -- young, handsome, 
charismatic, a great orator, and with a call to Austrians to have a love for 
their homeland. 17 This call imparticular flows smoothly into Austrian's 
16 "Austria: Austria's Election Results Detailed," Reuter Textline, 13 Mar. 1994. 
17 Parkinson, Conquering the Past: 275. 
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ears, ears which have lacked the sounds of nationalism, at least outward 
nationalism, for some time. 
Austrian history, just like German history, suffers from a great lack of 
continuity. Her history is sliced into eras of varying characters, elements, 
and, subsequently, nationalisms. Up until the fall of the Hapsburg Empire, 
the Austrians had always maintained their status in the hub of the empire. 
Austrians felt they were the core from which proceeded the formation of the 
great power in Central Europe and, even more, of the great Hapsburg 
empire.18· Perhaps ironically, then, the Hapsburg empire fell partially as a 
result of evolving nationalisms within its borders. In fact, it has long been 
customary to look upon the Republic of Austria as the child of the Paris Peace 
Conference and the Treaty of St. Germaine.l9 World War I left in its wake a 
small Austriart state in place of the once behemoth Hapsburg dynasty. 
Economic woes beset Austria and the question of "Austrian history" 
resurfaced time and again. Austria had no place in the world of,the interwar 
period -- "Austrian history", as understood by the Austrians, consisted of 
everything which took place in Central Europe between "antiquity and th~ 
end of World War I in 1918."20 
Austria emerged from the ruins of the once-mighty Hapsburg Empire 
without an identity, falling deeper and deeper into depression while 
struggling to pay war reparations. The terrible conditions after the war gave 
rise to a conviction that Austria as an independent state was simply not 
18 Fritz Fellner, "Introduction: The Genesis of the Austrian Republic," Modern Austria ( Palo 
Alto: Society for the Promotion and Scholarship Inc. 1981): 1.
 
19 Stadler, Austria. 107.
 
20 Ibid .. 2.
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economically viable. Most Austrians renewed their pan-German feelings to 
rally in support of a union with Germany "as an answer to their national 
aspirations and harsh economic realities."21 The Interwar period came to a 
close as the Nazis rose to power in Germany and declared the AnschlufJ, or 
the incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich, with an Austria eager to 
embrace a new identity. Euphoria died a painful death, however, as the 
AnschlufJ drew Austria into a devastating war and subsequent crushing 
defeat. 
Posl World War II Austria suffered from a similar identity crisis as the 
post World War I Austria. Vienna ,became known as 'four-in-a-boat' as the 
four victorious powers occupied the city and the country. Little national 
identity rooted itself in this era. However, the seeds were planted for the 
Second Republic -- an era which has introduced Austria to hopes of a national 
identity. The Allied powers opted not to penalize Austria for Nazi crimes, 
concluding that National Socialism in Austria was "a dead horse whose 
carrion would decompose in a natural manner."22 The carrion was declared 
officially decomposed in 1955, when Austria signed the State Treaty, 
receiving their small country in return for a declared neutrality. 
Since the signing of the State Treaty, Austria has embarked on a search 
for this 'national identity' which has proven elusive since the fall of the 
Hapsburg Empire. She has prospered economically and today Vienna reigns 
as an international crossroads between East and West. As Walter Maass 
21 Jelavich, Modem Austria 326.
 
22 Walter B. Maass, Country Without a Name (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing 1979)
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states, " The Austrians have learned to live and work together peacefully, but 
among the older generation the past is still an agonizing subject and a source 
of sometimes acrimonious discussion."23 A flashpoint is thus created in 
which a yearning for an established national identity of old and a 
dissatisfaction for the contemporary identity jostle eachother in a search for a 
distinctly new identity. At the same time, the current identity, which 
contrasts sharply with that of the old Hapsburg Empire in which Austria 
wielded a major portion of the power, tip-toes over issues which perhaps 
merit a non-peutral stance. This debate then returns us to such an issue -- the 
issue of immigration. 
Jorg Haider and the FPC> face the prospect of a sink-or-swim national 
election this upcoming October. Should the FPC> perform well on its anti­
foreigner, "Austria First" platform, the role of Austria will be that of a more 
assertive, isolationist Republic. 24 Borders will be fortified, Austria herself 
will form coalitions with other nations, and Austria will not have as strong a 
campaign for European Union membership under a Haider-led 
government.25 If the National Election results in a voting trend back toward 
the center, the SPC> and c>VP, Haider will have suffered an if not 
insurmountable, then huge, set-back. As the number of Asylum seekers in 
Austria continues to show a downward trend, Haider's platform may be 
dissolving under his feet. Since the coalition parties favor EU membership, 
an Austria would emerge from the election prepared for a more international 
23 Ibid .. 158.
 
24 Translated from the 1993 FPO Slogan: "Osterreich Zuerst !"
 
25 "Osterreichische FreiheitIiche gegen den EU-Beitritt;Keine Empfehlung fur die
 
Volksabstimmung," Neue Zurcher Zeituns 11 April, 1994, Ausland sec.: 2. 
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role, signaling a decrease in concern over issues upon which the FPC> 
platform are based. 
The National Election, however, should not be billed as a major 
turning point for Austria, with the future of the small republic hanging in 
the balance. The likely outcome of the election will see a public feeling more 
comfortable with the immigration issue, but casting protest votes unless the 
economy shows an improvement. Such a protest vote, in the author's 
opinion will not result in a massive swing in seats in the national 
government. However, it may send a firm message that Austrians are 
prepared for a more assertive natiopal identity. 
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